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Supplemental Needs Trusts: A Means to Conserve
Family Assets and Provide Increased Quality of
Life for the Disabled Family Member
Advances in medical technology, health care and other support
services have resulted in persons living longer' and have led to the
survival of individuals whose congenital defects or other injuries
would have, in earlier times, precluded their long term survival. As
a result, there are greater numbers of people living past the point
where they are able to care for themselves and greater numbers of
disabled 2 persons ,who are unable to fully provide for themselves.
Concurrently, the cost of health care has skyrocketed. s Likewise,
the costs associated with the unique medical and other support
services needs of the disabled have grown so that the care of a dis-
abled adult can consume tens of thousands of dollars per year."
Fortunately, public assistance programs can generally be relied
upon to provide for the basic necessities of medical care, food, and
shelter for those without the means to do so themselves.
For those families with disabled loved ones, it is only natural to
wish to provide support beyond these minimal subsistence levels,
to the extent the families are able, in order to increase the disabled
1. For instance, between 1980 and 1990 the life expectancy of Americans increased
from 77.4 years to 78.8 years for women, and from 70 years to 71.8 years for men. Christo-
pher Farrel, Health Care Costs: Don't be too Quick with the Scalpel, Bus. WK, Mar. 15,
1993, at 80. Of course, the increase in longevity cannot be attributed exclusively to improved
medical technology.
2. For the purposes of this comment, "disabled" is used, as it is under the federal
statute governing eligibility for Supplemental Security Income, to refer to "[a]n individual
. . . unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any. . . physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1382c(a)(3)(A) (Supp. 1993).
3. The total cost of health care in the United States has risen from 6% of the gross
national product in the 1970s to approximately 14% of the economy today. Adam Clymer,
Clinton's Roll of the Dice: Clinton Offering Health Plan with Guarantee of Coverage and
Curb on Private Spending, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1993, at Al, A9.
4. The average cost of nursing home care is in excess of $30,000 per year per patient
and, in Pennsylvania, 1.85 billion dollars of Medicaid- assistance alone is spent by the gov-
ernment for the care of some 66,000 nursing home patients. Harry Stoffer, Age-old Problem:
Nursing-home Costs Leave Families with Nothing, PiTTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, Oct. 3, 1993,
at Al, A12.
Duquesne Law Review
family member's quality of life. This is easily achieved during their
lives by providing the disabled person with financial assistance and
personal services as needed. The same result is traditionally ac-
complished after the death of the supporting family member
through the use of a testamentary trust, or an inter vivos trust cou-
pled with a testamentary pour-over provision, designed to provide
either a steady income or funds as needed. However, because eligi-
bility for public assistance programs may be keyed to certain mini-
mum levels of resources and income available to the disabled per-
son, the admirable desire of relatives to support their disabled
family member may actually work to disqualify the disabled per-
son for public assistance. The result of such disqualification is that
the trust funds supplant the otherwise available public assistance
until such time as the trust is depleted to a level at which the dis-
abled beneficiary could qualify for public benefits. Not only would
such a result be the antithesis of the typical settlor's desire to pre-
serve assets for the disabled beneficiary's future, but to the extent
that trust assets are required to provide for the enormous financial
needs of a disabled person, there could be a corresponding de-
crease in the trust assets available to provide income to other in-
tended beneficiaries or remaindermen.
This comment will explore one solution to this dilemma: the use
of a Supplemental Needs Trust 5 to provide for an increased quality
of life for the disabled person without such trust being deemed as
resources or income available for the purpose of determining eligi-
bility for public assistance. The major types of public aid available
to the disabled will briefly be reviewed, with attention directed to
financial eligibility levels and how such eligibility determinations
are made. This comment will then trace the development of the
supplemental support trust as it has evolved in Pennsylvania case
law and, finally, suggest drafting and litigation considerations.
BACKGROUND
This comment addresses only need-based public assistance pro-
grams, as opposed to public insurance programs.6 Two substantial
5. Also known as a Special Needs Trust. Michael Gilfix, Special Trusts for Asset
Preservation Planning, TR. & EST., Feb. 1993, at 62.
6. Need-based public assistance programs are distinguishable from other public in-
surance programs such as Social Security and Medicare. Social Security is generally availa-
ble to all those who meet age requirements and have had Social Security tax deducted from
their paychecks. 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(a) (Supp. 1993), 414(a) (1991). Medicare is available to all
those over age 65 and for disabled persons who have been eligible for Social Security disabil-
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sources of need-based public aid available to the disabled are Sup-
plemental Security Income ("SSI") and Medicaid, both of which
are federally funded programs. SSI provides assistance to the eld-
erly, blind and disabled,7 and is administered by the federal gov-
ernment." Medicaid also provides medical assistance to the aged,
blind and disabled, 9 eligibility for which is determined based, in
part, upon need as defined by the individual's available income
and assets. Although federally funded, Medicaid is administered
by the states pursuant to federal guidelines.10
As need-based programs, eligibility for both SSI and Medicaid is
based, in part, on the "resources" available to the client. As of Jan-
uary 1989, the applicable resource limitation for both SSI and,
generally, Medicaid is $2000.11 "Resource" is defined similarly
under federal and state regulations. For SSI purposes, resources
are cash or property that an individual owns and could liquidate.
12
Likewise, under the Pennsylvania regulations, a resource is defined
as property which an individual has or can use for support.13 Ex-
ity benefits for two years or more. 42 U.S.C. § 1395c (1992). Medicare is basically federally
funded health insurance which is paid for by payroll tax deductions and, in part, the pay-
ment of premiums and deductibles by Medicare recipients. JOHN J. REGAN, TAX, ESTATE &
FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR THE ELDERLY § 9.02(1) (1992). Thus, eligibility for neither program
is based on the recipient's financial need and, therefore, cannot be affected by the recipi-
ent's status as a trust beneficiary.
It should also be noted that, even though a disabled person can be eligible for it, Medicare
will not provide for more than 150 days of hospitalization nor for more than 100 days of
post-hospitalization extended care, 42 U.S.C. § 1395d (1992), and is, therefore, inadequate
for disabled persons requiring extensive medical care.
7. 20 C.F.R. § 416.110 provides:
The basic purpose underlying the supplemental security income program is to assure
a minimum level of income for people who are age 65 or over, or who are blind or
disabled and who do not have sufficient income and resources to maintain a standard
of living at the established Federal minimum income level.
20 C.F.R. § 416.110 (1993).
8. The SSI program is provided for, and governed under, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383
(1991, 1992 & Supp. 1993).
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396d(p)-(q) (1992 & Supp. 1993). Medicaid provides funding for,
among other things, psychiatric care, hospital services, nursing home care, clinical services,
and prescribed drugs. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (1992 & Supp. 1993); 42 C.F.R. §§ 440.1-.270
(1992).
10. In Pennsylvania, the regulations governing Medicaid are generally located in the
Public Assistance Manual which is found at 55 PA. CODE §§ 101-6600.
11. 42 U.S.C. § 1382a (1992); 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205(a) (1993).
12. Under the federal regulation, "resources means cash or other liquid assets or any
real or personal property that an individual (or spouse, if any) owns and could convert to
cash to be used for his or her support and maintenance." 20 C.F.R. § 416.1201(a) (1993).
13. Under the Pennsylvania regulation a resource is "[r]eal or personal property
which a person has or can make available for partial or total support, including equitable
interests and partial interests." 55 PA. CODE § 178.2 (1992). Additionally, the code requires
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cluded from these broad definitions are certain items such as the
claimant's principal place of residence, one automobile, and house-
hold goods and personal effects not exceeding $2000 in value14
which are, thus, not counted in determining the individual's eligi-
bility for SSI or Medicaid. If an applicant/recipient is deemed to
be in possession of more than $2000 worth of non-excluded re-
sources, the applicant/recipient will be ineligible for SSI or
Medicaid.15
In addition to the resource eligibility limitations, there are also
limitations on "income," above which there is a dollar for dollar
reduction in payments of SSI."6 Where income meets or exceeds
the SSI monthly benefit amount, eligibility for SSI payments will
be lost.1 7 Likewise, under the Pennsylvania regulations, continued
eligibility for Medicaid is conditioned on income remaining below
the applicable monthly income limits.
1 8
Income, too, is defined very broadly. For SSI purposes, income is
anything that can be used to obtain food, clothing or shelter.19 It is
further provided that in-kind income is food, clothing or shelter, or
something that can be used to acquire food, clothing or shelter. 0
Thus, the receipt of property that could be sold is in-kind income
because the proceeds of its sale could be used to obtain food, shel-
ter or clothing. 1 Under both the federal and state regulations,
that the "applicant/recipient shall take reasonable steps to obtain and make available re-
sources to which he is, or may be, entitled unless he can show good cause for not doing so."
55 PA. CODE § 178.1(g) (1992).
14. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1210 (1993); 55 PA. CODE §§ 178.61-.82 (1992 & 1993) (each giv-
ing complete listings of those items excluded from the definition of "resource").
15. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1205(a), (c) (1993).
16. 20 C.F.R. § 416.410 (1993) (providing that "[tihe monthly rate is reduced by the
amount of the individual's income which is not excluded.
17. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1100 (1993).
18. 55 PA. CODE § 181.11 (1992). As of January, 1992 the income limit for aged, blind
and disabled categories is $454.40 per month, and $1,266 per month for those receiving
skilled nursing care, heavy care or intermediate care. 55 PA. CODE § 181 app. A (1993).
19. The federal regulation states that "[i]ncome is anything you receive in cash or in-
kind that you can use to meet your needs for food, clothing or shelter." 20 C.F.R. § 416.1102
(1993). For Medicaid purposes, the Pennsylvania regulations list types of receipts that are
counted as either earned or unearned income. See generally 55 PA. CODE §§ 181.91-.110
(1989-1992) (listing types of income counted for the aged, blind and disabled).
20. The federal regulation provides that "[i]n-kind income is not cash, but is actually
food, clothing, or shelter, or something you can use to get one of these." 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.1102 (1993).
21. Despite this definition of in-kind income, it is not generally interpreted to require
that a receipt of property by a Medicaid/SSI client-which will not subsequently be deemed
a "resource" because it is excludable-be deemed "income" and, thus, result in the loss of
eligibility. For instance, under the regulations one automobile is excluded from the client's
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however, certain items are deemed not to be income and are not
counted in determining eligibility.22 One of the more useful exclu-
sions is that room and board received during a medical confine-
ment is not deemed to be in-kind income.2 Therefore, the pay-
ment by a relative for items not covered by Medicaid, such as an
upgrade to a private room, should not be counted.
Thus, to preserve a disabled client's eligibility for SSI and Medi-
caid, it is important that receipts or payments for his or her bills
fall into one of the categories of items excluded from income. Al-
ternatively, receipts should fall outside the definitions of income or
in-kind income.24
Another need-based public assistance program available in
Pennsylvania, under the Mental Health Act,25 involves the institu-
tionalization of the mentally disabled. Generally, the mentally ill
and mentally retarded are eligible for treatment and institutional
care at state mental hospitals and mental retardation centers.2 6
resources. If a relative makes car payments on behalf of the client, the definition seemingly
would deem that the client has income because the automobile may be sold to get food,
shelter or clothing. However, the Programs Operation Manual System ("POMS") states that
the client does not receive income from another's payment of the client's bills unless the
payment results in the receipt of food, clothing or shelter. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, PROGRAM OPERATIONS MANUAL SYSTEM, SI
00815.400 A. (1989). A similar result is reached under the Pennsylvania Medicaid regula-
tions which provide that receipt of non-cash items which are excluded from resources is not
income if the items are retained. 55 PA. CODE § 181.81(13) (1993).
22. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1103 (1993); 55 PA. CODE § 181.81 (1989 & 1992). Generally, the
federal regulation provides that the following are excludable from income: certain types of
medical care and services, social services, a receipt that reflects the change in form of a
resource, income tax refunds, payments made under a credit life or credit disability insur-
ance policy, loan proceeds, bills paid on behalf of the SSI/Medicaid recipient directly to the
supplier of the services so long as it does not constitute in-kind income, and replacement of
lost, stolen or destroyed income previously received. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1103 (1993).
23. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1103(2) (1993); 55 PA. CODE § 181.81(11)(ii) (1992).
24. The federal regulations use the illustration of a relative paying a lawn service
company for the client's lawn care. The payment is not imputed income to the client be-
cause it cannot be used to meet food, shelter or clothing needs. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1103(g)
(1993). Similarly, the POMS uses the example of a relative paying the phone company for a
SSI recipient's telephone bill. POMS, cited at note 21, at SI 00815.400 C. Many other ser-
vices should also be able to be paid for the client without the client being deemed to have
income in the amount of their value, such as cable television, haircuts, housekeeping and
cooking services, newspaper and magazine subscriptions, car maintenance, and so on.
25. Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 4101-4704 (1969 & Supp. 1993).
26. 55 PA. CODE §§ 4210.5-.6 (1985). This program is better characterized as a quasi
need-based public assistance program. The health care benefits are available without regard
to the individual's resources or income. 55 PA. CODE §§ 4210.5-.6 (1985). However, because
the commonwealth may seek reimbursement for the cost of care provided, the individual
may be subject to a reimbursement assessment depending on his resource or income levels.
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The Mental Health Act, however, provides that the commonwealth
may seek reimbursement for public funds expended from the men-
tally disabled person.2" The Department of Public Welfare
("DPW") considers all of a client's income, less $60 per month, to
be available to satisfy the client's liability. 8 Unlike the SSI and
Medicaid regulations, the Pennsylvania mental health/mental re-
tardation client liability regulations specifically address trust ac-
counts established in the client's name and provide that "[tihe
only . . . trust account that is not considered a resource to the cli-
ent is [a] . ..restricted trust account.
29
A restricted trust account is defined as a trust "legally restricted
from invasion of the principal amount for care and maintenance.
Income only may be assessed from such trusts."30 Thus, in addi-
tion to the considerable income restrictions required for SSI and
Medicaid continued eligibility, where a person has received care at
a state mental hospital or mental retardation center, all income re-
ceived by the client in excess of $60 per month is considered avail-
able to reimburse the commonwealth for such care.
SUPPLEMENTAL NEEDS TRUST
People who wish to support disabled family members or improve
their quality of life can, with some attention to detail, provide such
support without causing their disabled beneficiary to lose eligibil-
ity for SSI, Medicaid and other support services s which provide
the bulk of the disabled person's support. As outlined above, this
may be achieved by, first, ensuring that assets provided are either
excludable from countable resources or do not cause the disabled
person to own resources in excess of the applicable limits. Second,
the possibility that support provided will be considered as income
or as in-kind income must be avoided. This may be accomplished
by, one, compensating vendors directly for services and goods pro-
50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4501 (1969).
27. 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4501 (1969).
28. 55 PA. CODE § 4310.7(1)(i) (1989). However, before reimbursement is sought from
a client, the DPW must first determine whether reimbursement is available from Medicare
or third-party insurance. Id. at § 4310.5 (1989) (setting forth the sequential order of persons
liable for the cost of services).
29. 55 PA. CODE § 4310.12 (1989).
30. Id. In Lang v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 528 A.2d 1335, 1338 (Pa. 1987), the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held that, to the extent § 4310.12 was inconsistent with its
opinion, the regulation was invalid. See notes 40-49 and accompanying text.




vided to the disabled person, and, two, ensuring that the services
and goods provided are not, or cannot be used to acquire, food,
shelter or clothing.
The same result may be achieved after the donor's death with
the proper use of a supplemental needs trust.32 The purpose of a
supplemental needs trust is to provide the beneficiary with services
and supplemental support assets without supplanting the basic
support provided by government programs. To accomplish this,
the supplemental needs trust need only be structured so that, one,
the trust corpus cannot be considered an available resource of the
beneficiary, and, two, sufficient limitations are placed on disburse-
ments on behalf of the beneficiary such that they may not properly
be considered as income or in-kind income to the beneficiary. In
determining whether a trust achieves this result, courts generally
must apply traditional trust principles. In Pennsylvania, the intent
of the settlor controls.33
The inquiry into the settlor's intent has been influenced, how-
ever, by the public perception of public assistance. Until 1987, the
public policy of Pennsylvania, as announced by the courts, was
that public assistance was an odious means of support and was to
be avoided where at all possible. " As recently as 1983 this negative
attitude towards public assistance influenced the courts' construc-
tion of trusts benefiting the disabled. In Stoudt v. Department of
Public Welfare, 5 the issue presented was whether a discretionary
testamentary support trust created for, the benefit of an adult
nursing home resident receiving medical assistance was an availa-
ble resource of the beneficiary even though the trustee never in-
vaded the principal to provide for the beneficiary's support.3 6 The
trust, created by the beneficiary's father, directed the trustee to
"pay so much of the income and principal of said trust as he in his
32. It has also been suggested that a supplemental needs trust may be created by the
disabled person to receive and protect money from a personal injury settlement or judgment
and, thus prevent the award from supplanting otherwise available Medicaid funds. JOHN J.
REGAN & MICHAEL GILFIX, TAx, ESTATE & FINANCIAL PLANNING FOR THE ELDERLY: FORMS &
PRACTICE, 1:6[4] (1992). Such a self-settled trust may, however, run afoul of the Medicaid
qualifying trust rule which provides that, inter alia, all of the assets of an inter vivos trust
created by an individual for his own or his spouse's benefit are deemed available to the
beneficiary for Medicaid eligibility purposes. 42 U.S.C.S. § 1396a(k) (1992 & Supp. 1993).
See note 66 for a discussion of the Medicaid qualifying trust rule.
33. In re Pew's Estate, 191 A.2d 399, 405 (Pa. 1963) (stating the rule as "the pole star
in every trust . . is the settlor's . . . intent and that intent must prevail").
34. See notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
35. 464 A.2d 665 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983).
36. Stoudt, 464 A.2d at 666.
1994
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discretion deem[ed] necessary for the maintenance and support of
[his] daughter," and to pay the principal and accumulated income
to the remaindermen at her death.37 In summarizing the Depart-
ment of Public Welfare's ("DPW") contention, the court stated
that the trust corpus was an available asset because the trustee
was obligated to carry out the purpose of the trust-providing for
the beneficiary's support-instead of conserving the trust assets
for the remaindermen and "forcing [the beneficiary] to resort to
public welfare."38 In siding with the DPW's position and finding
that the beneficiary was not eligible for medical assistance, the
court rejected the petitioner's argument that it was within the
trustee's discretion to consider the availability of Medicaid and
other public assistance in determining whether the beneficiary's
support and maintenance were being provided for adequately.3 9
Four years later, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania announced
a new public policy with respect to public assistance that was con-
trary to that governing earlier cases. In Lang v. Department of
Public Welfare,4 ° a testamentary discretionary support trust had
been created for the benefit of all the settlor's children, one of
whom was a mentally disabled adult institutionalized in a state
mental retardation center.4 The trustee was directed to pay the
income of the trust, and was given the discretion to invade the
principal, for the "support, maintenance, welfare and benefit" of
the settlor's disabled son.42 The DPW ruled, and the common-
wealth court affirmed, that the trust principal was a resource avail-
able to the son and, not only destroyed his eligibility for medical
assistance, but also was accessible to satisfy his liability to the
state for the cost of his institutionalization under the Mental
Health Act.4
3
The supreme court, in referring to the Stoudt decision, "re-
ject[ed] as a matter of public policy Commonwealth Court's impli-
37. Id.
38. Id. (emphasis added).
39. Id. The court held that the trust principal was available because the beneficiary
could have compelled the trustee to invade the principal. Id. It is implicit in this holding
that the public policy was that a person should not be forced to resort to public assistance,
otherwise the beneficiary would not have the right to compel the trustee to invade the prin-
cipal if public assistance were sufficient for her support.
40. 528 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1987).
41. Lang, 528 A.2d at 1339-41.
42. Id. at 1340-41. The trustee was further directed to distribute the income not nec-
essary for the disabled son's support among the settlor's other children and, at the disabled
son's death, to distribute the trust estate among the settlor's children or their survivors. Id.
43. Id. at 1340.
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cation that it is in a beneficiary's interest not to be 'forced to resort
to public welfare.'-"" It further held that the public policy of
Pennsylvania did not view public assistance as charity with the re-
sulting assumption that a settlor intends to supplant public assis-
tance otherwise available to the beneficiary."5
The court then stated that where the settlor gives the trustee
discretion to consider funding otherwise available from the com-
monwealth in determining whether to make distributions for the
beneficiary's support, the trust cannot be deemed to be available to
the beneficiary and, therefore, cannot be considered an available
resource."' The court then went on to ascertain the settlor's intent
with respect to the trustee's authority to consider sources of public
assistance, in light of its public policy statement.47 The court de-
termined from the trust language, the scheme of distribution and
the circumstances surrounding execution that the settlor's intent
was to provide support for his son to the extent it was necessary,
taking into account support available from other sources such as
public assistance. 4 As such, the trustee's decision to refuse to use
the income or principal for the son's support, in light of the sup-
port available from the state, was not an abuse of her discretion
and, thus, the son could not compel distribution from the trust.
Consequently, the DPW could not properly categorize the trust as
44. Id. at 1342.
45. Id. The court held that "[tihe statutory policy of Pennsylvania. . . does not re-
flect this vision of public assistance as charity and the consequent assumption that a settlor
intended to exhaust his family's patrimony before his beneficiary could take advantage of
public funds." Id.
46. Lang, 528 A.2d at 1339. The court stated that "[i]f . . . the testator gave the
trustee discretion to consider funding otherwise available from the Commonwealth in deter-
mining whether to distribute trust income or principal (or either) for [the beneficiary's]
support, the trust. . . would not be available for [the beneficiary's) use and could not be
considered his asset or resource." Id. (citation omitted).
47. Id. at 1342. The court restated the rule in Pennsylvania that "[a] settlor's intent
must be determined 'from all the language within the four corners of the trust instrument,
the scheme of distribution and the circumstances surrounding the execution of the instru-
ment.'" Id. (citations omitted).
48. Id. at 1345. The factors which led the court to this conclusion included: (1) the
settlor's use of a discretionary support trust instead of a pure support trust; (2) the use of
the words "welfare and benefit" in addition to the standard "support and maintenance"
language, indicating an intent that the trustee have the discretion to do more than ensure a
minimum level of support; (3) the use of the phrase "complete discretion" in describing the
trustee's authority to invade principal on the disabled son's behalf; (4) the fact that testator
used one trust to benefit all of his children; (5) the circumstances surrounding execution of
the instrument, specifically, that his son was institutionalized at the time of execution; and
(6) the fact that interpreting the trust as urged by the DPW would be contrary to the public




In 1991, the supreme court, in two separate cases decided con-
currently, was again faced with determining whether a settlor in-
tended that the trustee take into account public assistance funds
in deciding whether a disabled beneficiary's support was ade-
quately provided for and, thus, whether the trust was an available
resource. In Snyder v. Department of Public Welfare,0 a testa-
mentary trust provided that the trustee was to "use as much of the
net income . . . as well as so much of the principal; as in the Trus-
tee's discretion may be necessary or desirable for the support,
maintenance and care of [the settlor's] two children."51 Following
execution of the instrument, the settlor's adult son was disabled in
an'automobile accident and was subsequently placed in a nursing
home. 2 The son received Medicaid assistance while at the nursing
home, however, within a year after settlor's death, the DPW deter-
mined that the income and principal of the trust were available
resources thereby making the son ineligible for Medicaid.53 Apply-
ing an analysis substantially the same as the court used in Lang,
54
the court found that the settlor's intent was such that the trust
principal could not properly be considered as an available re-
source.5 5 The court identified the following factors in reaching its
interpretation: (1) the trust was to benefit two of the settlor's chil-
dren; (2) at the time of the settlor's death, her disabled son was
receiving public assistance; and (3) finding the testator's intent to
be otherwise would defeat the effect that the testator intended the
trust to have.56
49. Id. at 1345.
50. 598 A.2d 1283 (Pa. 1991).
51. Snyder, 598 A.2d at 1284.
52. Id. at 1285.
53. Id. The DPW's determination was made in July, 1987, the same month that the
supreme court handed down its decision in Lang. Id. The DPW subsequently reaffirmed its
determination in December, 1987, when the trustee reapplied for Medicaid on behalf of the
disabled son. Id. The trustee appealed the determination, and the commonwealth court af-
firmed with respect to the trust income, but, holding that the language was discretionary
with respect to principal, reversed the DPW's finding that the principal was available to the
son. Id. The DPW appealed the court's decision to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Id.
54. The rule of interpretation quoted at note 47 was repeated by the court. Id. at
1285 n.4.
55. Id. at 1287. The court did not decide whether the income was available since the
trustee did not appeal from that portion of the commonwealth court's decision holding that
the income was available to the beneficiary. Id. at 1285 n.3.
56. Snyder, 598 A.2d at 1287. With respect to the third factor, which the court found
to be the most convincing, it reasoned that if the trust were held to be an available resource
the trust's intended effect would be defeated. because, not only would the disabled son be
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The second case reviewed, Commonwealth Bank and Trust
Company, N.A. v. Department of Public Welfare," involved a tes-
tamentary trust which was drafted to benefit the settlor's mother
and provided that the trustee was to pay the net income to the
settlor's mother, and further authorized the trustee, in his uncon-
trolled discretion, to pay so much of the principal as was deemed
necessary for her support and maintenance, taking into considera-
tion "income or principal" available to her from other sources." In
finding that factors comparable to those in Lang9 were not pre-
sent, the court held that the settlor intended that the entire trust
principal be used for his mother's care and, thus, was an available
resource disqualifying her for medical assistance.60 The court iden-
tified three factors that it interpreted as indicating an intent that
the trustee was to not look first to the commonwealth for the sup-
port of the beneficiary: (1) at the time the instrument was exe-
cuted, there existed a duty on the part of the settlor to care for the
beneficiary; (2) the trust did not permit the trustee to consider
other resources and public benefits, but only other "income and
principal"; and (3) the trust had no co-beneficiaries.6 1
1. Planning Considerations
Although not statutorily provided for, it is evident that supple-
mental needs trusts are available under Pennsylvania case law.62
Not only did the supreme court's declaration of the common-
wealth's statutory policy with respect to public benefits make the
deprived of the public assistance to which he had previously become entitled, but the set-
tlor's daughter, the co-beneficiary, would also be deprived of a share of the trust benefits.
Id.
57. 598 A.2d 1279 (Pa. 1991).
58. The trust provided, in pertinent part that, the trustees were "to pay the net in-
come in at least quarterly installments" to the settlor's mother for life, and authorized the
trustees "in their uncontrolled discretion, but having in mind the income and principal that
may be available to or for her from other sources, to pay . . . so much of this trust as my
Trustees shall deem needful or desirable for her support and maintenance." Commonwealth
Bank and Trust, 598 A.2d at 1279-80.
59. See note 48 and accompanying text.
60. Id. at 1282.
61. Id.
62. In the two most recent cases addressing the issue of supplemental needs trusts,
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has felt "compelled to remark . . . that the ultimate
resolution of these issues can best be debated and resolved within the legislative arena.
However, until clearer legislative guidelines are enacted, courts will be confronted with de-
veloping guidelines on a case by case basis." Snyder, 598 A.2d at 1287 n.9; Commonwealth
Bank and Trust, 598 A.2d at 1282 n.11.
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supplemental needs trust possible,"3 the opinion in Lang expressly
endorsed the use of such trusts. In Lang, the court expressed its
concern over the dilemma faced by a settlor with a disabled family
member, namely, that the settlor should not be compelled to either
deplete the family's resources in providing for the disabled benefi-
ciary or, alternatively, leave the handicapped member impover-
ished because of the resource and income limitations of need-based
public assistance programs.6 In the context of benefits available
and liabilities imposed under the Mental Health Act, the court fur-
ther expressed its belief that settlors are "entitled" to the use of a
trust to provide care to the disabled beneficiary without effectively
disinheriting the other beneficiaries.65
To be effective, the supplemental needs trust66 need only achieve
one basic requirement: the trust income and assets must not be
considered available to the SSI/Medicaid recipient to such an ex-
tent as would put the recipient over the eligibility limitations.6 7 In
Pennsylvania, achieving this result is a relatively simple task in-
volving merely a clear expression of the settlor's intent to create
the appropriate type of trust and to limit the availability of trust
income and assets to provide for supplemental needs alone.6 8
First, a supplemental needs trust must take the form of either a
63. See note 45 and accompanying text.
64. Lang, 528 A.2d at 1345. The court stated that "[a] settlor should not be required
to either bankrupt his family or run the risk of leaving a handicapped member destitute or
in want because of vagaries in the requirements for public assistance." Id.
65. Id. The court said:
We believe a settlor is entitled to maintain some control by means of a support stan-
dard, and at the same time reasonable flexibility through a grant of considerable dis-
cretion to the trustee(s), to ensure his purpose of providing reasonable care to the
beneficiary who is or may be institutionalized without effectively disinheriting the
other members of his family.
Id.
66. A supplemental needs trust may be either inter vivos or testamentary. In most
cases, a minimally funded inter vivos trust will be just as effective as a testamentary trust
where the donor's will provides for all or a portion of his estate to "pour over" into the inter
vivos trust should the disabled loved one survive the donor. Caution in using an inter vivos
trust is required, however, where the trust is created to benefit a Medicaid claimant by his
or her spouse. Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1396a(k) (1992) such trusts are deemed to be "Medicaid
Qualifying Trusts" and, contrary to what the name suggests, all assets and income of the
trust are deemed to be resources and income available to the claimant spouse and, thus,
may easily result in loss of Medicaid eligibility. Id. Because § 1396a(k) applies only to trusts
created "other than by will," the Medicaid Qualifying Trust may readily be avoided by the
use of a testamentary trust where spouses are involved. Id.
67. See notes 11-24 and accompanying text.
68. See note 46 and accompanying text.
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pure discretionary trust or a discretionary support trust 69 to
achieve the desired result, as opposed to a "pure" support trust or
a trust mandatory as to income or distributions from principal.
70
Some commentators writing on this subject recommend that the
supplemental needs trust be purely discretionary and not contain
any language permitting distributions for the beneficiary's support
on the grounds that "[s]upport language may raise an inference
that the beneficiary is entitled to support out of the trust fund
even though he has other resources."' 1 As the law stands in Penn-
sylvania, however, this constraint is not required because the su-
preme court has expressly rejected any mechanical categorization
of trusts using "support" language and those using only "discre-
tionary" language, on the grounds that such a distinction "ignores
the intent of a settlor who includes both support and discretionary
69. A discretionary trust exists where the terms of the trust provide that the trustee
shall distribute only so much of the income or principal as the trustee sees appropriate to
pay in his discretion. 2 AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM F. FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS
§ 128.3 (4th ed. 1987). Because the distributions are dependent on the trustee's discretion, a
beneficiary is entitled to only the amounts the trustee elects to distribute to him. SCOTT, at
§ 128.3. Further, the beneficiary may only compel the trustee to make distributions if it can
be shown that the trustee has abused his discretionary power. Id. Given that the beneficiary
may not normally compel distributions, the trust assets may not properly be characterized
as available to the beneficiary for public benefits eligibility purposes.
A discretionary support trust is merely a discretionary trust wherein the trustee's discre-
tion is limited by a support standard. See, e.g., Lang, 528 A.2d at 1344.
70. A "pure" support trust or a trust that is mandatory with respect to distribution
of income or invasion of principal cannot achieve the desired result of a supplemental needs
trust. A "pure" support trust requires the trustee to apply so much of the income or princi-
pal as is required for the beneficiary's support without giving the trustee the discretion to
determine whether the beneficiary's support could be adequately provided for from other
sources. SCOTT, cited at note 69, at § 128.4 ("Where the trustee is directed to pay to the
beneficiary. . . so much as is necessary for his maintenance or support, the inference is that
the settlor intended that he should receive his support from the trust estate, even though he
might have other resources."). As such, the beneficiary will have the right to compel distri-
butions and, consequently, the trust is an asset available to the beneficiary. Carol Ann
Mooney, Discretionary Trusts: An Estate Plan to Supplement Public Assistance for Dis-
abled Persons, 25 ARiz. L. REV. 939, 945 (1983). The same is true of any trust mandatory
with respect to distributions of income or from principal. Mooney, Discretionary Trusts, 25
ARIz. L. REV. at 944.
71. Mooney, cited at note 70, at 963. The author recommended avoidance of support
language, even though the inference should arise only with a pure support trusts, because
the courts do not always distinguish between pure support trusts and trusts giving the dis-
cretion to provide support. Id. at 963 n.139. See also, Lawrence A. Frolick, Discretionary
Trusts for a Disabled Beneficiary: A Solution or a Trap for the Unwary, 46 U. Pirr. L. REV.
335, 342 (1985) (recommending against the use of language which "requires the trustee to
provide for the 'support', 'needs' or 'maintenance' of the beneficiary" because the trust may
be interpreted as a "semisupport" trust under which the trustee could be compelled to make
distributions even if the distributions would supplant public benefits).
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language in his trust instrument. '72 In Lang, the court expressly
approved of the use of a discretionary support trust in holding that
it "believe[d] a settlor is entitled to maintain some control by
means of a support standard, and at the same time reasonable flex-




Second, the trust instrument should clearly manifest the set-
tlor's intention to provide only for the disabled beneficiary's sup-
plemental needs and, thus, allow the trustee to take into account
public assistance available in determining whether the benefi-
ciary's basic support is provided for adequately. Language stating
that the settlor does not intend trust assets to be used to supplant
any public assistance benefits otherwise available should be ade-
quate to accomplish this.74 Further, language should be included
limiting the trustee to making distributions that are not counted as
resources or income to the beneficiary for SSI/Medicaid eligibility
purposes, because distributions made by a trustee with complete
discretion may easily push an SSI/Medicaid recipient over the eli-
gibility limitations despite the fact that the distributions are made
only for supplemental needs.
7 5
The need for clarity in this expression of intent cannot be over-
emphasized since the initial determination of whether the trust is
72. Lang, 528 A.2d at 1344. The court reasoned that, where a trust uses both support
and discretionary language, the intent of the settlor may be ignored if the trust is character-
ized as purely support, in which case the trust assets will be depleted "leaving nothing for
remaindermen and ensuring only a minimal level of support" for the disabled beneficiary.
Id. Likewise, the settlor's intent is ignored if the trust is characterized as purely discretion-
ary because he will be required to place "blind faith in the uncontrolled discretion" of the
trustee. Id. at 1345.
73. Id. See note 65 for the full text of the passage.
74. The following language in a "Trust Purpose" paragraph has been suggested for
use in supplemental needs trusts:
The purpose of this trust is to supplement, but not to supplant, whatever benefits
and services [the beneficiary] ...may from time to time be eligible to receive by
reason of age, disability, or other factors, from federal, state, and local governmental
and charitable sources. . . . It is, therefore, my intent and direction that the trustee
use the principal of the trust to provide the primary beneficiary with those benefits
and services, and only those benefits and services, that, in the trustee's judgement,
are not otherwise available ....
HARRY S. MARGOLIS, ELDERLAW FORMS MANUAL ESSENTIAL DocuMENTS FOR REPRESENTING
THE OLDER CLIENT § 13.1 (1992).
75. For instance, the trust instrument may contain, in a paragraph setting forth the
extent of the trustee's discretion, an illustrative laundry list of "supplemental" items that
are excludable from the beneficiary's income or resources under federal and state regula-
tions as guidance to the trustee. MARGOLIS, cited at note 74, at § 13.3.; also see note 24 and
accompanying text. Further examples of suggested language may be found at REGAN &
GILFIX, cited at note 32, at § 1:17.
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available to the disabled beneficiary will likely be made by a fed-
eral or state case worker probably unskilled in the art of interpre-
tation of the language and legal effect of trust instruments. Even
though a less than clearly drafted supplemental needs trust may be
salvaged from a unfavorable DPW determination in an appeal, 6
litigation should be avoided because the cost of litigation could de-
plete the assets of a modestly funded trust just as easily as a find-
ing that the trust was available for the beneficiary's basic support
could.
Given that public assistance is provided for by statute, eligibility
for need-based public assistance is always subject to legislative re-
vision. Therefore, another planning consideration should be the in-
clusion of a trust provision providing for the termination of the
trust and distribution of the assets should the trust imperil the
beneficiary's eligibility."
2. Litigation Considerations
In the event that the DPW determines that the assets of discre-
tionary support trust are resources available to disabled benefi-
ciary, the trustee may appeal the determination.s The key to a
court's determination of whether a discretionary support trust is
"available" to an SSI/Medicaid recipient for eligibility purposes is
whether the disabled beneficiary may compel the trustee to make
distributions in excess of the eligibility amounts.7 9 Whether the
beneficiary may so compel the trustee is governed by whether the
trustee has the discretion to look first to public assistance benefits
otherwise available in determining whether the beneficiary's sup-
port is provided for adequately.
In determining whether the trustee may look first to public as-
sistance, it is well established that the settlor's intent controls.80 As
76. See notes 80-93 and accompanying text, discussing the factors from which the
Pennsylvania courts will find that a settlor's intent was to provide for only the beneficiary's
supplemental needs and, thus, preclude a determination that a trust was available to the
disabled beneficiary for public assistance eligibility purposes.
77. Gilfix, cited at note 5, at 63-64. The author suggested that such a provision serves
as a deterrent to government agencies which may challenge the trust. Id. at 64,
78. 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5105 (1981); PA. R. App. P. 1501.
79. Lang, 528 A.2d at 1339. See also 55 PA. CODE § 178.1(g) (1992) (requiring the
Medicaid recipient to "take reasonable steps to obtain and make available resources to
which he is, or may be entitled to").
80. See Lang, 528 A.2d at 1342 (In making this determination, the court must ascer-
tain "whether a settlor ... intended that the trust assets be used to support a beneficiary,
regardless of the availability of other resources, including state assistance.").
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noted above, in Pennsylvania the settlor's intent must be deter-
mined from a three-pronged analysis: (1) the language of the trust
instrument; (2) the scheme of distribution; and (3) the circum-
stances surrounding execution of the instrument.81 Where the dis-
cretionary support language of the instrument fails to expressly
authorize the trustee to take into account public assistance availa-
ble to the beneficiary, the cases discussed point to several relevant
factors from which the courts will find a sufficient manifestation of
the requisite intent.
First, under the "language of the instrument" prong of the rule
of interpretation,82 the most important factor is whether the trus-
tee was given the discretion to determine whether distributions
were to be made.83 Words expanding on the traditional "support
and maintenance" language of a support trust have been held to be
a factor indicating the requisite intent for a supplemental needs
trust. For instance, in Lang, language giving the trustee the power
to accumulate income and the use of the words "welfare and bene-
fit" were held to indicate an intent to create a "discretionary trust
limited by a support standard" rather than a pure support trust.8 4
Conversely, language limiting the trustee's discretion should mili-
tate against finding the requisite intent. It also appears that, where
the language expressly gives the trustee the power to take into ac-
count some alternate sources of support but fails to mention public
assistance, the court will find an intent to not give the trustee the
power to take into account public assistance.8 5
Second, under the "scheme of distribution" prong of the rule of
interpretation, 6 the factor the courts have given the most weight
81. See notes 47 and 82.
82. In Pennsylvania, "[a] settlor's intent must be determined 'from all the language
within the four corners of the trust instrument, the scheme of distribution and the circum-
stances surrounding the execution of the instrument.'" Lang, 528 A.2d at 1342 (citation
omitted); Snyder, 598 A.2d at 1285 n.4.
83. See Lang, 528 A.2d at 1342. This is, of course, necessitated by the general re-
quirement that the trust be either a discretionary or discretionary support trust. A pure
support trust does not give the trustee the discretion to consider other sources of support
and, thus, vests in the beneficiary the power to compel distributions. As a result, the trust is
"available" to the beneficiary for SSI/Medicaid eligibility purposes. See note 69 and accom-
panying text.
84. Lang, 528 A.2d at 1342.
85. Language allowing the trustee to take into account "income and principal" availa-
ble from other sources was held in Commonwealth Bank and Trust to actually limit the
trustees discretion to consider public assistance otherwise available since "public benefits,
while they are a'resource, are neither income nor principal." Commonwealth Bank and
Trust, 598 A.2d at 1282.
86. See note 82.
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to is whether the trust benefits several beneficiaries rather than
the SSI/Medicaid recipient alone. In both Lang and Snyder, sig-
nificant to the courts' findings that the settlors intended to merely
supplement public assistance available to the disabled benefi-
ciaries, was the fact that the trusts were designed to benefit loved
ones in addition to the disabled beneficiaries. The courts have
held that implicit in such a scheme is an intent to not benefit one
beneficiary if to do so would result in damage to the interests of
the others, a result certain to occur if the trustee were required to
disburse trust assets for the substantial needs of a disabled benefi-
ciary until the assets were spent down to the SSI/Medicaid eligibil-
ity limits.88 Conversely, a trust designed to benefit only the dis-
abled relative may militate against finding that a supplemental
needs trust was intended and that, instead, it was intended that all
the trust assets were to be made available for the beneficiary's
care.
8 9
Another factor related to the scheme of distribution is the per-
centage of the settlor's estate with which the trust is funded.
Where the trust benefiting the disabled relative is funded with the
majority of the settlor's estate, the courts appear more likely to
find an intent to create a supplemental needs trust.90
87. Lang, 528 A.2d at 1343; Snyder, 598 A.2d at 1287. In Snyder, the court stated
that the most notable characteristic distinguishing the trust in that case from the trust in
the Commonwealth Bank and Trust case was "that the trust there had but one life benefi-
ciary whose ability to compel the trustee to act was superior to all of the contingent remain-
dermen," whereas in Lang and Snyder, "the trustee was accountable.to multiple life benefi-
ciaries." Snyder, 598 A.2d at 1287 n.8.
88. Snyder, 598 A.2d at 1287.
89. See Commonwealth Bank and Trust, 598 A.2d at 1282.
90. In Lang, the funding of a trust with 67% of the settlor's estate was noted as a
factor indicating an intent to merely supplement public benefits otherwise available. Lang,
528 A.2d at 1343. Likewise, in Snyder, the trust was funded with the "bulk" of the settlor's
estate. Snyder v. Department of Pub. Welfare, 556 A.2d 31, 33 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1989).
Conversely, in Commonwealth Bank and Trust, the trust was not funded with the majority
of the settlor's estate, but rather the bulk of his assets were devised to his wife and children
in his will. Commonwealth Bank and Trust, 598 A.2d at 1282.
The court did not, in any of these decisions, set forth its reasoning for this relationship
between percentage of the settlor's estate and intent to create a supplemental needs trust.
One possible explanation is that where a discretionary trust is intended to provide for more
than one beneficiary, as in Lang and Snyder, it can be inferred that the settlor would not
have funded the trust with the bulk of his estate had he anticipated that the majority of the
trust distributions would be in favor of the disabled beneficiary, to the detriment of the
other beneficiaries and to the benefit of only the commonwealth.
A related factor, addressed in other jurisdictions, is whether the trust's funding is insuffi-
cient to provide for the disabled beneficiary's needs, in which case it has been held that the
settlor did intend to create a supplemental needs trust. Julianne Sartain, Comment, Probate
Code Section 15306: Discretionary Trusts as a Financial Solution for the Disabled, 37
1994
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Third, under the "circumstances surrounding execution" prong
of the rule of interpretation"1 the most important factor appears to
be whether the disabled beneficiary was already receiving public
assistance. In Lang, the court held that the fact that the disabled
beneficiary's cost of institutional care was being partially subsi-
dized by the commonwealth at the time the settlor executed his
will "point[ed] strongly to the testator's intent to have his trustee
consider other resources. Similarly, the fact that the disabled
beneficiary was receiving public assistance at the time of the set-
tlor's death was deemed to be a relevant factor by the Snyder
court, because it indicated that the settlor was aware of the availa-
bility of such benefits, even though at the time of execution of the
instrument not only was the beneficiary not receiving public assis-
tance, but he also had not even been disabled yet.9
CONCLUSION
A supplemental needs trust clearly expressing the settlor's intent
to supplement rather than supplant available public assistance can
be a valuable tool for conserving a family's resources and increas-
ing the beneficiary's quality of life while, at the same time, making
optimal use of public benefits available to the beneficiary."' Trust
provisions providing for supplemental support are useful not only
in trusts designed to support a presently disabled family member,
but may also be advisable where the beneficiaries are fully capable
of providing for their own support, as illustrated in Snyder.9 5 Even
where a trust is deemed to be available to the beneficiary for pub-
lic assistance purposes by the DPW, the supplemental needs trust
may still be salvaged by a court determination that the settlor's
UCLA L. REV. 595, 601 (1990).
91. See note 82.
92. Lang, 528 A.2d at 1343. The beneficiary's care was only partially subsidized by
the commonwealth because, at the time, the Mental Health Act provided that parents had a
legal duty to support their adult children and were, thus, liable for the cost of their institu-
tional care. Id. at 1340. The settlor had entered into an agreement with the commonwealth
whereby the commonwealth agreed to pay part of the cost of the settlor's son's care. Id. at
1339.
93. Snyder, 598 A.2d at 1287.
94. See notes 62-77 and accompanying text.
95. Recall that, in Snyder, it was not until after the trust instrument was drafted and
executed that the settlor's son, an intended beneficiary of the testamentary trust, became
disabled. Snyder, 598 A.2d at 1285. A similar situation arises where the beneficiary's place-
ment in a nursing home is necessitated by, instead of a single catastrophic event, infirmity




intent, as determined from the language of the trust instrument,
the scheme of distribution, and the circumstances surrounding exe-
cution, was to give the trustee the discretion to consider public as-
sistance otherwise available in ascertaining whether the benefi-
ciary's support is adequately provided for.
9 6
In light of the supreme court's declaration of public policy re-
garding the availability of public assistance and its approval of the
use of supplemental needs trusts, the use of such trusts should
continue to be viable in Pennsylvania, absent substantial revision
of resource and income deeming provisions of the applicable fed-
eral and state regulations."
Scott Gardner
96. See notes 78-93 and accompanying text.
97. As of the time of the writing of this comment, the health care reform program is
still at the proposal stage and its ultimate effect on the Medicaid program is not clear. It has
been reported that the Clinton administration health reform plan proposes to actually in-
crease medical assistance eligibility limits so that a Medicaid recipient would be entitled to
retain up to $12,000 of resources and keep up to $100 per month income. Harry Stoffer,
Health Plan Advances Long-term Care Issue, PITrSBURGH POsT-GAzErrE, Oct. 3, 1993, at
A13. The supplemental needs trust should continue to be useful, however, under any pro-
gram which makes access to public medical assistance contingent on the recipient's financial
need.
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